Putting a Leash on the Court of Justice? Preconceptions in National Methodology v Effet Utile as a Meta-Rule by MAYR, Stefan
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            European Journal of Legal Studies 
 
Title: Putting a Leash on the Court of Justice? Preconceptions in National Methodology v 
Effet Utile as a Meta‐Rule 
Author(s): Stefan Mayr 
Source: European Journal of Legal Studies, Volume 5, Issue 2 (Autumn/Winter 2012/13), p 
 8-21 
 
 
Abstract:  
 
The Court of Justice has time and again come under criticism for alleged methodological 
shortcomings and its dynamic approach towards interpretation. But who determines the boundaries 
between interpretation and admissible or inadmissible (ultra vires) creation of law? And where does 
the dividing line lie, given that the Member States have by and large accepted the most obvious 
creations of the Court of Justice (e.g. direct effect of directives, state liability etc.)? Any answer 
depends on our understanding of (a) the concept of interpretation as such and (b) the principle of effet 
utile – in a way the Court’s interpretive leitmotif and as I will argue, a meta-rule of interpretation 
(and as such a small contribution to a genuine European methodology). 
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[W]hoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written, or spoken Laws; it is He who is 
truly the Law-giver to all intents and purposes; and not the Person who first wrote or spoke 
them.1 
 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Time and again, the Court of Justice has been harshly criticised for its dynamic approach 
towards ensuring ‘that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is 
observed’2.3 In German and Austrian doctrine this criticism mainly concerns alleged 
methodological shortcomings: Instead of constructing, the Court of Justice is said to be 
creating law. 
 
Is such criticism tenable? Some theorists have argued, that it lies in the nature of language 
as such and of (general and abstract4) legal provisions in particular, that legal texts always 
require interpretation. Accordingly, their meaning – and hence, their normative content (ie 
the norm5) – would solely depend on their interpretation.6 If so, the prevailing opinion in 
German and Austrian doctrine – assuming that the ‘wording’ or the ‘potential meaning’ of 
the legal text determines the boundary between interpretation (Auslegung) and creation of 
law (Rechtsfortbildung) – would be based on circular reasoning, limiting interpretation to the 
potential meaning of a legal text, which in itself depends on interpretation. However, this 
sceptical view, which will be referred to as ‘realist approach’, is highly contentious. Part of 
the (counter-)criticism is based on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later language philosophy. 
According to Wittgenstein, ‘[i]nterpretations by themselves do not determine meaning’7; 
to the contrary, any such attempt would result in the paradox of infinite regress.8     
  
                                                 
1 Benjamin Hoadly Lord Bishop of Bangor, The Nature of the Kingdom or Church of Christ. A Sermon preach’d 
before the King 31 March 1717 (accessed via google.books) 12. 
2 Art 19 (1) Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2010] OJ C83/13 (TEU). 
3 Eg Roman Herzog and Lüder Gerken, ‘Stoppt den Europäischen Gerichtshof’ FAZ (Frankfurt, 9 September 
2008) <http://www.cep.eu/presse/cep-in-den-medien/pressearchiv-2008/> accessed 1 September 2012. For 
further details: Marco Laudacher, ‘Methodenlehre und Rechtsfindung im Gemeinschaftsrecht’ [2010] 
UFSjournal 85, 90; Leslie Manthey and Christopher Unseld, ‘Grundrechte vs. „effet utile“ – Vom Umgang des 
EuGH mit seiner Doppelrolle als Fach- und Verfassungsgericht’ [2011] ZEuS 323, 324; sceptical against such 
criticism Bernhard W Wegener, Art 19 EUV, in Christian Calliess and Matthias Ruffert (eds) EUV/AEUV 
(4th edn, CH Beck 2011) para 17. 
4 ‘Generality’ in this context is not to be mistaken for vagueness:  Max Black, ‘Vagueness. An Exercise in 
Logical Analysis’ (1937) 4 Philosophy of Science 427, 432. 
5 According to Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (University of California Press 1978) 5, ‘“Norm“ is the 
meaning of an act by which a certain behavior is commanded, permitted, or authorized’. 
6 cf Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Lawbook Exchange 2009) 146; but also Karl Larenz, 
Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (2nd edn, Springer 1992) 93: ‘Es wäre ein Irrtum, anzunehmen, 
Rechtstexte bedürften nur dort der Auslegung, wo sie besonders ‚dunkel‘, ‚unklar‘ oder ‚widersprüchlich‘ 
erscheinen; vielmehr sind grundsätzlich alle Rechtstexte der Auslegung sowohl fähig wie bedürtig.’  Jochen 
Anweiler, Die Auslegungsmethoden des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (Peter Lang 1996) 26 f 
describes interpretation as a process of translation which is a very graphic image with a view to the large 
number of official languages in EU law. 
7 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (3rd edn, Basil Blackwell 1986) para 198; cf Stefan Griller, 
‘Gibt es eine intersubjektiv überprüfbare Bedeutung von Normtexten?’ in Stefan Griller, Karl Korinek and 
Michael Potacs (eds), Grundfragen und aktuelle Probleme des öffentlichen Rechts: Festschrift für Heinz Peter Rill zum 
60. Geburtstag (LexisNexis 1995) 543 (550). 
8 Wittgenstein (n 7) para 201; cf James Tully, ‘Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy’ in Cressida J Heyes (ed), 
The Grammar of Politics (Cornell University Press 2003) 17, 38. 
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Hence, who can determine the boundaries between interpretation and admissible or 
inadmissible (ultra vires) creation of law? And where could the dividing line lie, given that 
the Member States have by and large accepted the most obvious creations of the Court of 
Justice (e.g. direct effect of directives9, state liability10 etc)? 
 
Clearly, any assessment of the Court’s case law depends on (and more or less openly 
expresses) an underlying methodological position. Finding an orthodox understanding of 
interpretation not tenable, a (modified) realist approach will bear significant consequences 
on our further understanding of the Court’s interpretive practice in general and the effet utile 
principle – in a way the Court’s interpretive leitmotif – in particular.  
 
This paper will focus on sketching out a theoretical and methodological framework which 
will allow us to re-conceptualise effet utile as a meta-rule of interpretation. As such, effet utile 
can enhance the systematic assessment of EU law and be a fragment of a developing 
genuine European methodology.  
 
2. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY 
 
2.1 The Role of the Court of Justice 
 
According to art 19 (1) TEU, the Court of Justice11 ‘shall ensure that in the interpretation 
and application of the Treaties the law is observed’. Therefore, it not only decides upon the 
validity of EU law but also interprets it authoritatively and finally.12 Moreover, the Court 
also regards it as its duty to grant comprehensive legal protection, even where it requires 
going beyond the black letter law of the Treaties.13 Arguably, the broad concept of ‘law’ in 
art 19 TEU (in contrast to the narrower notion of ‘the Treaties’) and the dynamic approach 
towards integration reflected in the Preamble of the TFEU14 justify such creation of law – 
at least to a certain extent.  
 
In principle the Court of Justice and national (constitutional) courts use similar methods of 
interpretation.15 According to the Court’s settled case law ‘it is necessary to consider not 
only [a provision’s] wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objects of the 
                                                 
9 Starting with Case 41/74 Yvonne van Duyn v Home Office [1974] ECR 1337. 
10 Starting with Joined Cases C-6/90 and 9/90 Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others v Italian 
Republic [1991] ECR I-5357; for state liability in connection with the judiciary cf Case C-224/01 Gerhard 
Köbler v Republik Österreich [2003] ECR I-10239. 
11 I will only consider the Court of Justice, not the General Court or any specialised courts and will therefore 
refer to it as the Court of Justice or simply the Court. 
12 cf Franz C Mayer, ‘Multilevel Constitutional Jurisdiction’ in Armin von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast (eds), 
Principles of European Constitutional Law (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2011) 399, 401 ff. 
13 cf eg Joined cases 7/56, 3/57 to 7/57 Dineke Algera, Giacomo Cicconardi, Simone Couturaud, Ignazio Genuardi, 
Félicie Steichen v Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community [1957] ECR 39 para 55: ‘The 
possibility of withdrawing such measures is a problem of administrative law, which is familiar in the case-law 
and learned writing of all the countries of the Community, but for the solution of which the Treaty does not 
contain any rules. Unless the Court is to deny justice it is therefore obliged to solve the problem by reference 
to the rules acknowledged by the legislation, the learned writing and the case-law of the member countries.’ 
14 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2010] OJ C83/47. Just like 
the Preambles of the TEEC and the TEC it expresses the wish of the contracting parties ‘to lay the 
foundations of an ever closer union’; cf Michael Potacs, ‘Effet utile als Auslegungsgrundsatz’ [2009] EuR 465, 
474 ff. 
15 Christian Calliess‚ ‘Grundlagen, Grenzen und Perspektiven europäischen Richterrechts’ (2005) 58 NJW 929, 
929. 
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rules of which it is part’16. However, strikingly, the Court by stressing effet utile 
considerations often goes beyond an isolated purposive interpretation of a specific provision 
(eg of secondary law) and draws on the aims or purpose of the Treaties as such instead.17 
This openness inherent in the concept of effet utile evidently bears a considerable potential 
for conflict.18 
 
2.2 The Notion and Concept of Effet Utile 
 
Although the concept of effet utile plays a particularly prominent role in its case law, the 
Court of Justice has not ‘invented’ it. Quite the contrary – effet utile considerations can be 
traced back to Roman law (ut res magis valeat quam pereat) and have been explicitly codified 
in numerous modern legal orders.19  
 
Also in international law, effet utile is regarded as ‘one of the fundamental principles of 
interpretation of treaties’20. However, effectiveness considerations are here sometimes 
counterbalanced by another interpretive rule (in dubio mitius), prescribing the ‘restrictive 
interpretation of treaty obligations in deference to the sovereignty of states’21.  
 
In translations of early decisions of the Court of Justice, the French expression ‘effet utile’ 
appeared in parentheses.22 English translations now frequently use the terms 
‘effectiveness’23 or ‘full effectiveness’24, more rarely also ‘full force and effect’25 or ‘practical 
effect’26. In practice, however, these different terms refer to the same concept and lead to the 
same results.27  
 
Whereas distinguishing between effet utile in a narrow and broad sense28 or a weak and 
strong effet utile may be useful, it is also important to keep in mind that it is one concept, a 
continuum between these poles. We do not have to push the idea of effet utile far to exclude 
                                                 
16 Case C-223/98 Adidas AG [1999] ECR I-7099 para 23; Case 76/06 P Britannia Alloys & Chemicals Ltd v 
Commmission of the European Communities [2007] ECR I-4443 para 21; with regard to primary law: Case C-
156/98 Germany v Commission [2000] ECR I-6882.  
17 Case 13/72 Netherlands v Commission [1973] ECR 27 paras 29 ff. 
18 Utility considerations aside, it has to be borne in mind that the Treaties also contain ‘counterweights’ such 
as the principles of conferral, subsidiarity or proportionality (art 5 TEU) which may also have a certain 
influence on the interpretation of EU law. cf Potacs (n 14) 476 ff. 
19 Eg art 1157 of the French Code Civil: ‘Lorsqu'une clause est susceptible de deux sens, on doit plutôt 
l'entendre dans celui avec lequel elle peut avoir quelque effet, que dans le sens avec lequel elle n'en pourrait 
produire aucun.’ For numerous further examples: Anna von Oettingen, Effet utile und individuelle Rechte im 
Recht der Europäischen Union (Nomos 2010) 41. 
20 Eg Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad) (Judgment) [1994] ICJ Rep 1994, 6, para 51: ‘Toute 
autre lecture de ces textes serait contraire à l’un des principes fondamentaux d’interprétation des traités, 
constamment admis dans la jurisprudence internationale, celui de l’effet utile’ (references omitted). 
21 At length Christophe J Larouer, ‘In the Name of Sovereignty? The Battle over In Dubio Mitius Inside and 
Outside the Courts’ [2009] Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference Papers 
<http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lps_clacp/22> accessed 1 September 2012. 
22 Eg Case 9/70 Franz Grad v Finanzamt Traunstein [1970] ECR 825 para 5. 
23 Eg Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 629 para 20; Case 
8/81 Ursula Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt [1982] ECR 53 para 23. 
24 Eg Francovich (n 10) para 33; Simmenthal II (n 23) para 23; Case C-213/89 The Queen v Secretary of State for 
Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others [1990] ECR I-2433 para 21. 
25 Eg Factortame (n 24) para 20. 
26 Eg Case 70/72 Commission v Germany [1973] ECR 813 para 13.  
27 cf the Simmenthal II case (n 23) where the Court uses ‘effectiveness’ and ‘full effectiveness’ interchangeably. 
28 Potacs (n 14) 467. 
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an absurd interpretation or one that would render certain guaranteed rights ‘meaningless’29. 
Similarly the Court argues quite often that adopting a different interpretation ‘would be 
tantamount to rendering [a certain right] ineffective and nugatory’30. But effet utile in an 
increasingly stronger (or wider) sense also prevents that a legal act or provision is ‘deprived 
of a not insignificant aspect of its effectiveness’31, or that its effectiveness is ‘severely 
undermined’32 or even (just) ‘impaired’33. 
 
3. METHODOLOGICAL (RE-)CONCEPTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EFFET 
UTILE 
 
While the flexibility of the concept of effet utile has become obvious from what has been said 
so far, its methodological nature remains somewhat unclear. The prevailing (German and 
Austrian) opinion regards effet utile as an aspect of teleological interpretation34, a conception 
that will be challenged subsequently. Critically assessing an orthodox perception of 
interpretation in the light of a realist approach will bear significant consequences on the 
further understanding of the effet utile principle.  
 
3.1 Key Elements of an Orthodox Perception of Interpretation 
 
3.1.1 A Function of Knowledge – Focus on the Text 
 
From a traditional (also referred to as orthodox) point of view, interpretation is a function 
of knowledge (not the will) and can be described as the text-based and text-bound finding of 
the correct meaning of a norm. Binding the exercise of state power to a published and 
accessible text is essential for the underlying understanding of the rule of law (Rechtsstaat). 
Paradigmatically Karl Larenz assumes, that interpretation means to neither add nor omit 
anything and just make the text speak for itself (by asking the right questions).35  
Consequently, proponents of this view argue, that the limits to interpretation can be 
determined by the meaning of the text itself.36 
 
3.1.2 Legislator’s Intention 
 
Intended deference to the legislator often leads to the question ‘What was the legislator’s 
intention?’ This question is certainly prone to misapprehension. However, it has been 
argued quite convincingly that this question should not be understood as aiming at 
ascertaining any ‘psychological’ intention. Much more, it should be understood as an 
attempt to determine, what can be imputed to the legislator according to the general rules 
and habits of communication and the general linguistic usage.37   
                                                 
29 Case C-438/05 Internatinoal Transport Workers’ Federation and Finish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and 
ÖU Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779 para 65. This would be a case where a weak effet utile ‘suffices’. 
30 Case 157/86 Mary Murphy and others v An Bord Telecom Eireann [1988] ECR 673 para 10. 
31 Joined cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 French Republic and Société commerciale des potasses et de l'azote (SCPA) and 
Entreprise minière et chimique (EMC) v Commission of the European Communities [1998] ECR I-1375 para 171.  
32 Case C-450/06 Varec  SA v État belge[2008] ECR I-581 para 39. 
33 Simmenthal II (n 23) para 20; Factortame (n 24) para 21. 
34 For an overview: Sibylle Seyr, Der effet utile in der Rechtsprechung des EuGH (Duncker & Humblot 2008) 103. 
35 Larenz (n 6) 255. 
36 ibid 210; Anweiler (n 6) 29; Franz Bydlinski, Juristische Methodenlehre und Rechtsbegriff (2nd edn, Springer 
1991) 423; Wegener (n 3) para 12. According to Arthur Meier-Hayoz the wording serves a double purpose ‘Er 
ist Ausgangspunkt für die richterliche Sinnermittlung und steckt zugleich die Grenzen seiner 
Auslegungstätigkeit ab.’ Der Richter als Gesetzgeber  42, quote from Larenz (n 6) 210. 
37 Heinz Peter Rill, ‘Juristische Methodenlehre und Rechtsbegriff’ [1985] ZfV 461, 577; Michael Potacs, 
Auslegung im öffentlichen Recht (Nomos 1994) 24. 
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These rules can be distinguished into semantics (meaning of words) and pragmatics 
(context, purpose) which are normally closely interlinked. Still, a purely pragmatic 
transgression of the semantic meaning can be methodologically admissible (eg analogy, 
teleological reduction).38 This shows that the weighting of these methods varies and 
therefore does not follow a strict rule. Much more, all these criteria for interpretation form a 
flexible system39, inevitably open to multiple (value) judgments of the interpreting 
individual. 
 
3.1.3 Creation of Law 
 
According to common opinion, the (admissible) creation of law is regarded less exceptional 
in EU law due to its gaps and its integrative and dynamic function.40 Nevertheless the 
Court of Justice is not to be seen as a ‘substitute legislator’41 and has time and again been 
harshly criticised in this regard. Even though German doctrine sporadically questions the 
usefulness of the attempt to draw a line between interpretation and creation of law42, the 
practical effect of such scepticism exhausts itself in terminological sophistry. The result 
remains the same: One can and has to distinguish between admissible and inadmissible 
(ultra vires) creation of law. The latter comprises any interpretation contra legem and any 
acts in which the Court fails to maintain political neutrality and strictly refrains from policy 
making.43  
 
3.2 Critical Assessment – Positivism Revisited? 
 
The orthodox view of interpretation described above seems to be rooted in a rather 
formalistic understanding of law. Contrasting this view with Hans Kelsen’s theory of law 
and Michel Troper’s ‘théorie réaliste de l’interprétation’44 produces some fruitful 
contradictions, which challenge a widespread preconception of legal ‘interpretation’. 
Moreover, finding a considerable dose of realism in Kelsen’s pure positivism also challenges 
the formalistic narrative which is still widely spread e.g. in traditional Austrian legal 
thinking.45 
 
3.2.1 Kelsen – ‘[T]he court is always a legislator’ 
 
For Kelsen ‘the court is always a legislator’.46 It ‘will always add something new’47, no 
matter how detailed a general norm may be. Moreover, insofar as decisions of a court are 
                                                 
38 Potacs, Auslegung (n 37) 34 ff. 
39 ‘Bewegliches System’, ibid 40. 
40 Ulrich Everling, ‘Richterliche Rechtsfortbildung in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft’ [2000] JZ 217, 220. 
41 cf Anweiler (n 6) 54. 
42 Eg Larenz finds interpretation and creation of law ‘nicht als wesensverschieden‘ (n 6 at 254), only the 
‘kreative Anteil des Subjekts‘ (ibid 255) varies. See also Seyr (n 34) 334 ff who coins creation of law as 
‘Weiterentwicklung‘ (development), but basically argues for the well known traditional limits to the CJEU’s 
jurisdiction; ibid 337 ff. 
43 Calliess (n 15) 932. 
44 cf Michel Troper, ‘Constitutional Justice and Democracy’ (1995-96) 17 Cardozo L Rev 273, 282 ff; cf also the 
critical assessment of Otto Pfersmann, ‘Contre le neo‐ réalisme juridique. Pour un débat sur l’interprétation’ 
(2000) 52 Revue Française de Droit Constitutionnel 789 ff. 
45 cf more generally and most insightful John Gardner, ‘Legal Positivism: 5 ½ Myths’ (2001) 46 American 
Journal of Jurisprudence 199. 
46 Kelsen, General Theory (n 6) 146; Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (2nd edn, Österreichische Staatsdruckerei 
1992) 252 ff. 
47 Kelsen, General Theory (n 6) 146; Larenz (n 6) insinuates quite the same: „Dabei ist für den Vorgang der 
Auslegung daß der Ausleger nur den Text selbst zum Sprechen bringen will, ohne etwas hinzuzufügen oder 
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binding upon future decisions in similar cases (precedents48), courts create general norms 
and are ‘legislative organs in exactly the same sense as the organ which is called the 
legislator’49.  
 
However, this has nothing to do with any gaps in the legal order. Kelsen finds it logically 
impossible that the legal order has gaps. For him, the legislator (probably unconsciously) 
uses the ‘fiction of “gaps of law”’ to authorise e.g. courts to create new norms to avoid unjust 
or inequitable results in cases not previously considered (and therefore not covered by any 
general norm).50 However, at the same time this fiction restricts the role of courts (as 
legislators) by creating an artificial pressure of justification. 
 
To make things clearer: According to art 20 III of the German Basic Law, the judiciary is 
bound ‘by law and justice’ (‘Recht und Gesetz’). The difference between interpretation and 
creation of law in the German context is clear: The consequences of interpretation are 
accepted as consequences of the legal provision itself, whereas any creation of law requires 
thorough justification.51  
 
The Court of Justice is endowed with the authentic and final interpretation of EU law and 
therefore a veritable lawmaker, creating general norms. Moreover, it is a court of last resort 
and therefore – according to Kelsen – its decision ‘cannot be considered illegal, as long as it 
has to be considered a court decision at all’52. However, like the national courts, the Court of 
Justice depends on the willingness of the legal community to accept its decisions as binding 
and authoritative (and act accordingly). As a consequence, applying the yardstick of national 
methodology increases the (political) pressure of justification for the Court of Justice.  
 
Interestingly, national constitutional courts, and in particular the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, still seem to enjoy greater trust in their respective legal 
communities than the Court of Justice.53  
 
3.2.2 Troper – Théorie Réaliste de l’Interprétation 
 
At a first glance, the quintessence of Troper’s théorie réaliste appears quite provocative:  
  
According to [the realist theory of interpretation] the legal system empowers some 
authority to produce an interpretation of the text. This authority [...] is free to give any 
meaning to the text, which therefore has no meaning of its own prior to the interpretation.54 
 
Troper’s theory is descriptive; its cognitive interest lies in the process of interpretation by 
legal authorities (‘authentic interpretation’), not the outcome or method used in any 
                                                                                                                                                        
wegzulassen. Wir wissen freilich, daß sich der Ausleger dabei niemals nur rein passiv verhält (…).“ at 201 (emphasis 
added). 
48 In this connection it seems noteworthy that an analysis of the ECJ’s case law for the year 1999 found that 
the most frequent method of interpretation was the reference to previous case law (ie precedents). Mariele 
Dederichs, ‘Die Methodik des Gerichtshofes der Europäischen Gemeinschaften’ [2004] EuR 345, 347. 
49 Kelsen, General Theory (n 6) 150. 
50 ibid 147. 
51 cf Larenz (n 6) 257. 
52 Kelsen, General Theory (n 6) 155. 
53 It is noteworthy in this regard, that according to art 79 III GG not even the legislator could ‘correct’ certain 
decisions of the BVerfG; cf Manthey and Unseld (n 3) 324; Everling (n 40) 217 f. 
54 Michel Troper, ‘Constitutional Interpretation’ (2006) 39 Israel LRev 35, 36. However, Troper notes: ‘Of 
course, the fact that this opportunity exists does not mean that the courts always use it unreservedly.’ (n 44) 
288. 
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particular case. His main assumptions – which fundamentally challenge the cognitive (and 
normative) potential of legal science as such – are that interpretation is a function of the will 
(not knowledge) and that a legal text does not bear any objective meaning (due to the 
vagueness of language as a medium for communication).55  
 
Surprisingly, and even more remarkably, similar realist ideas have by and large been 
anticipated by Kelsen: 
 
Traditional theory will have us believe, that the statute, applied to the concrete case, can 
always supply only one correct decision and that the positive-legal “correctness” of this 
decision is based on the statute itself. This theory describes the interpretive procedure as if it 
consisted merely in an intellectual act of clarifying or understanding; as if the law-applying 
organ had to use only his reason but not his will, and as if by a purely intellectual activity, 
among the various existing possibilities only one correct choice could be made in accordance 
with positive law.56 
 
Kelsen insinuates interpretation as a function of the will as well as the absence of any 
objective meaning.57 For him the indeterminacy of a legal act can be intentional or 
unintended. Unintended indeterminacy stems from the immanent vagueness of language as 
a medium.58 
 
In order to guard against misunderstandings, a caveat is in place: The realist approach is 
largely based on the vagueness of language as a medium for (legal) communication. 
However, ‘[w]e cannot know that a word is vague, unless we know something about its 
use.’59 According to Wittgenstein, ‘[f]or a large class of cases – though not for all – in 
which we employ the word “meaning” it can be defined thus:  the meaning of a word is its 
use in the language.’60 However, this use (or meaning) is not equivalent with the orthodox 
idea of a correct and objectively cognisable meaning of a legal text61, against which the 
realist approach outlined above, argues. It is important to differentiate the basic (yet truly 
fundamental) question of how words can have meanings from the question to what extent 
such meanings prescribe the outcomes of an authentic interpretation. Arguably legal 
interpretation presupposes a deep understanding of the use of the legal language.62 ‘It is 
only in normal cases that the use of a word is clearly prescribed’63; ‘interpretation begins 
                                                 
55 See also Michel Troper, ‘Marshall, Kelsen, Barak and the constitutionalist fallacy’ (2005) 3 Int’l J Const L 
(I.CON) 24, 34 f. A third assumption challenges the equation of meaning and intention. This question is dealt 
with above 3.1.2. It has to be mentioned however, that the variety of languages and cultures represented in the 
EU legislation considerably complicates our finding of rules and habits of communication and the general 
linguistic usage. 
56 Kelsen, Pure Theory (n 5) 351. 
57 For the opposite opinion prominently Larenz (n 6): ‘Gegenstand der Auslegung ist der Gesetzestext als 
“Träger“ des in ihm niedergelegten Sinnes, um dessen Verständnis es in der Auslegung geht.’ 201 (emphasis 
added). 
58 Kelsen, Pure Theory (n 5) 350. 
59 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues’ (1994) 82 California LR 509, 
511. 
60 Wittgenstein (n 7) para 43. 
61 Griller (n 7) 560. 
62 Tully (n 8) 39 ‘Understanding grounds interpretation’; on the issue of infinite regress: According to 
Wittgenstein (n 7), ‘any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets and cannot give it 
any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning’ (para 198), much more there is always 
another interpretation standing behind it, which leads to the paradox of infinite regress (para 201). It should 
therefore be possible to disrupt the chain of infinite regress by substituting one expression of the rule for 
another (ie interpretation according to Wittgenstein, para 201), reaching a point where we can imagine a 
doubt, without actually doubting the meaning (cf para 84). 
63 Wittgenstein (n 7) para 142. 
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when our conventional self-understandings break down and we do not know how to go 
on.’64 Arguably courts of last instance which decide complex cases and apply indeterminate 
(‘contestable’65) normative standards (like effet utile, proportionality etc.) are thus – as the 
realist approach suggests – relatively free in giving specific meaning to legal texts.   
 
Frequently there will exist a number of ‘arguable norm-hypotheses’66. In the absence of one 
correct meaning, there can also be no right decision67, but only a decision taken by an 
authority granted jurisdiction by the legal order.68 Consistently, the Court of Justice rejects 
any limitation to its interpretive competence:  
 
It must also be borne in mind, even where the different language versions are entirely in 
accord with one another, that Community law uses terminology which is peculiar to it. 
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that legal concepts do not necessarily have the same 
meaning in Community law and in the law of the various Member States.69 
 
Again, this corresponds with Kelsen’s understanding of ‘authentic [ie law-creating] 
interpretation’70 which is strictly limited to law-applying organs.71 Legal science is much 
more limited: ‘Jurisprudential interpretation can do no more than exhibit all possible 
meanings of a legal norm. Jurisprudence as cognition of law cannot decide between the 
possibilities exhibited by it but must leave the decision to the legal organ who, according to 
the legal order, is authorized to apply the law.’72 
 
3.2.3 In a Nutshell 
 
Legal science (which is no legal authority) lacks the criteria to evaluate whether an 
authentic interpretation is right or wrong, whether e.g. the Court of Justice has taken ‘the 
right decision’. This is merely a question of legal policy, not science or theory.73  
 
Authentic interpretation is then less of a ‘theoretical-cognitive’ process but much more the 
exercise of ‘practical power’, factually limited (to some extent!) by the acceptance within the 
legal community, therefore requiring sound reasoning and the adherence to certain 
argumentative standards.74 Its validity depends on the authority of the organ, not the 
content of this result. Once a decision has become final (res iudicata), the validity of the 
created norm can no longer be rescinded. Therefore Kelsen notes: ‘It is well known that 
                                                 
64 Tully (n 8) 38 f. 
65 Waldron (n 59) 526: ‘different users disagree about the detailed contents of that normative standard’. In fact 
Waldron argues that these contestable terms, by inviting us to make value judgments do not ‘undermine the 
determinacy of their meanings. On the contrary, it is part of the meaning of these words to indicate that a 
value judgment is required …’ 527. Contestable terms thereby become ‘a verbal arena in which we fight out 
our disagreements …’ 530. 
66 Adamovich and others (eds), Österreichisches Staatsrecht, vol 1 (2nd edn, Springer 2011) para 03.009. 
67 Again Larenz (n 6): ‘Die Absicht, nur das auszusprechen, was der „richtig verstandene“ Text von sich aus 
be-sagt, macht die typische Haltung des Interpreten aus.‘ ( 255). 
68 In this sense ‘Creation of law is always application of law’ and vice versa, Kelsen, General Theory (n 6) 133, 
149. 
69 Case 283/81 Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health [1982] ECR 3415 para 19. 
70 Kelsen, Pure Theory (n 5) 354. 
71 ibid 354 ff. 
72 ibid 355. cf Adamovich and others (n 66) para 03.010. 
73 Kelsen, Pure Theory  (n 5) 352 eg reminds us that there exists no legal criterion to decide whether to apply 
an argumentum e contrario or an analogy.   
74 At length Ralph Christensen and Markus Böhme, ‘Europas Auslegungsgrenzen’ [2009] Rechtstheorie 285, 
294 ff. 
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much new law is created by way of such authentic interpretation, especially by courts of last 
resort.’75    
However, there is a second side to it: whereas (almost) any interpretation by a court of last 
instance may be valid76, its effectiveness depends on the acceptance within the legal 
community. Hence there is a certain pressure to actually stick to general rules and habits of 
communication and the general linguistic usage. 
 
3.3 Consequences – Effet Utile as an Interpretive Meta-Rule 
 
If we accept the above established conception of interpretation, ie that there is virtually no 
grey area between interpretation and (inadmissible) creation of law, the latter appears as a 
catchword, aiming at constraining the Court of Justice substantially – but in a 
methodological (and seemingly objective) disguise. If the threat is serious enough, the Court 
may even change its interpretation – however for political, not legal reasons. 
 
Similarly, effet utile might serve as a political slogan, aiming at convincing the legal (or 
much more political) community of the Court’s rationality.  
 
However, if we can derive interpretive meta-rules from the Court’s argumentative patterns 
we can assess the process against the standards of such meta-rules and the Court’s 
consistency (or arbitrary deviance) in their application. 
 
Arguably effet utile is one of these meta-rules. It is not a rule of general linguistic usage and 
neither part of semantics nor pragmatics but logically comes into play, once potential 
meanings (or norm-hypotheses) have been established. It serves as a guideline without 
being an interpretive method itself.77 As mentioned above it is a flexible concept, varying 
gradually but not qualitatively.78 An absurd interpretation undermines the utility of a norm 
fundamentally. Hence preserving the validity of a provision can be understood as a very 
basic expression of furthering its utility.  
 
Effet utile functions as a rule of choice and therefore logically presupposes a variety of 
arguable norm-hypotheses.79 It cannot be applied in the absence of any doubt or 
alternatives. Even the avoidance of an absurd interpretation presupposes at least one 
arguable alternative (not absurd) meaning. Exceptionally this may not be the case: ‘The law 
simply prescribes something nonsensical. Since laws are man-made, this is not impossible.’80  
 
In a situation where the Court has to choose from alternative arguable norm-hypotheses, 
effet utile emphasises or even prioritises the teleological aspects. Among alternative 
meanings, it favours those furthering the effectiveness of EU law, putting a twofold 
emphasis on teleological aspects (with a view to the provision but also EU law in its 
entirety). It functions as an exclusionary rule of choice between tentative interpretive 
results. 
 
This may sound rather trivial but the added value of this conception lies in an enhanced 
rationalisation:  
 
                                                 
75 Kelsen, Pure Theory  (n 5) 355. 
76 Apart from ultra vires or non-existent acts. 
77 Marcus Mosiek, Effet utile und Rechtsgemeinschaft (LIT 2003) 7. 
78 Differently von Oettingen (n 19) 34 f.  
79 cf von Oettingen (n 19) 91. 
80 Kelsen, Pure Theory (n 5) 250. 
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According to the prevailing opinion a result that – semantics and pragmatics considered – 
cannot convincingly be found as consistent with the intention of the legislator, amounts to 
creation of law.81 What may be considered ‘convincing’ has to be decided on a case by case 
basis with regard to the result of this interpretive act, ie the meaning, hence the norm itself. 
However, according to the view advanced here, legal science – lacking any legal authority – 
can develop norm hypotheses but not decide which result may be regarded as convincing. 
  
What legal science can offer instead is an evaluation of the process of interpretation. 
Assuming that the traditional methods of interpretation form a flexible system, their 
relative weight in a specific case is governed by meta-rules of interpretation.82 Hence, the 
admissibility of a certain interpretation depends on the plausibility of this weighing process. 
According to the opinion put forward here, any result that is arguable within a given set of 
meta-rules must be considered ‘convincing’. Contrariwise, an inadmissible creation of law is 
one that violates (ie transgresses) these meta-rules in toto.  
 
4. EFFET UTILE IN THE CASE LAW OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE 
 
4.1 Obvious Creations of Law 
 
Due to the vast number of judgments referring to effet utile, the following section can only 
present a very small selection of relevant cases. It has been mentioned in the beginning that 
the Member States have by and large accepted the most obvious creations of law, many of 
them can be seen as cornerstones of the EU legal order.83 In accepting these decisions, the 
Member states have accepted arguments based on weak and strong effet utile considerations 
alike. However, this shows that the Court’s own effectiveness strongly depends on the 
acceptance of its reasoning in the legal community and some authors argue that only this 
acceptance can prove the Court right or wrong.84  
 
The direct effect of directives85 serves as a prime example: The Court found it ‘incompatible 
with the binding effect attributed to a directive by [art 288 TFEU] to exclude, in principle, 
the possibility that the obligation which it imposes may be invoked by those concerned. In 
particular, where the Community authorities have, by directive, imposed on Member States 
the obligation to pursue a particular course of conduct, the useful effect of such an act would 
be weakened if individuals were prevented from relying on it before their national courts 
and if the latter were prevented from taking it into consideration as an element of 
Community law.’86 Once the Court’s argument had been accepted it dropped the reference to 
effet utile87 and applied direct effect without reiterating a detailed reasoning.88   
 
                                                 
81 Potacs, Auslegung (n 37) 41. Either the result cannot be established at all or better reasons indicate a 
different result: ibid 277. 
82 Another meta-rule was formulated by the Court of Justice in the CILFIT decision (n 69), namely ‘that legal 
concepts do not necessarily have the same meaning in Community law and in the law of the various Member 
States’ (para 19). 
83 Rather obvious creations of law can also be found in other fields, concerning eg questions of residence and 
access to social benefits and have been criticised particularly harshly; cf Case C-184/99 Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre 
public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR I-6193 and the criticism of Calliess (n 15) 932 
and below. 
84 cf Everling (n 40) 227. 
85 van Duyn (n 9). 
86 van Duyn (n 9) para 12 (emphasis added). 
87 Eg Case 152/84 M. H. Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority (Teaching) 
[1986] ECR 723 para 47. 
88 Eg Becker (n 23); cf von Oettingen (n 19) 133 ff.  
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Subsequently some of the more contentious decisions will be discussed. These borderline 
cases show argumentative shortcomings but may also serve as departure points for future 
considerations on refining effet utile as an interpretive meta-rule.  
 
4.2 Borderline Cases 
 
4.2.1 Non-Discrimination on the Grounds of Age 
 
At the time the Court’s Mangold decision89 was among the particularly sharply criticised 
decisions.90 The Grand Chamber held that the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of 
age constitutes a (directly effective) general principle of EU law. The difficulty with its 
reasoning was that the Treaty of Amsterdam had actually introduced the prohibition of 
discrimination on the grounds of age (Art 13 TEC), but only as a provision authorising the 
enactment of secondary law. The critics argued that such an authorisation implies that the 
Member States particularly did not want to introduce any directly effective prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of age. However, recalling Kelsen’s view, this is a typical 
situation where the Court has to take a policy decision. There exists no legal criterion to 
decide between an argumentum e contrario and an analogy.91 
 
4.2.2 Fundamental Freedoms and European Citizenship 
 
The Court of Justice regularly relies on effet utile in cases involving Fundamental Freedoms, 
often broadening their scope or limiting exceptions92 and other restrictions which obstruct 
the exercise of a Fundamental Freedom or simply make it less attractive93. Finally, it also 
constructs potential justifications for exceptions narrowly.94  
 
Interestingly the Court takes a similar approach towards European Citizenship. The Grand 
Chamber decision in Ruiz Zambrano95 is quite illustrative in this regard: The Court held 
that ‘Article 20 TFEU precludes national measures which have the effect of depriving 
[minor, and dependent] citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of 
the rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union.’96 The ‘genuine 
enjoyment of the substance of the [citizen] rights’ arguably means the full effectiveness, the 
effet utile, of these rights. The refusal to grant a right of residence but also a work permit to 
a third country national with such ‘dependent minor children in the Member State where 
those children are nationals and reside’97 is likely to produce exactly this effect: 
 
It must be assumed that such a refusal would lead to a situation where those children, 
citizens of the Union, would have to leave the territory of the Union in order to accompany 
their parents. Similarly, if a work permit were not granted to such a person, he would risk 
not having sufficient resources to provide for himself and his family, which would also result 
in the children, citizens of the Union, having to leave the territory of the Union. In those 
                                                 
89 Case C-144/04 Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm[2005] ECR I-9981. 
90 Most prominently Herzog and Gerken (n 3). 
91 Kelsen, Pure Theory (n 5) 352. 
92 Eg Case 2/74 Jean Reyners v Belgian State [1974] ECR 631 concerning the right to establishment (and 
exceptions thereto) with regard to the profession of lawyers. 
93 cf Case 33/74 Johannes Henricus Maria van Binsbergen v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de 
Metaalnijverheid [1974] ECR 1299, with regard to the freedom to provide services. 
94 cf Case C-355/98 Commission v Belgium [2000] ECR I-1221 paras 28 ff with regard to public policy and 
security. 
95 Case C-34/09 GerardoRuiz Zambrano v Office nationale de l’emploi (ONEm) [2009] (ECJ 8 March 2011). 
96 ibid para 42. 
97 ibid para 43. 
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circumstances, those citizens of the Union would, in fact, be unable to exercise the substance 
of the rights conferred on them by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union.98 
 
Already in Zhu and Chen99 the Court argued that the refusal to grant a right of residence to 
the carer would deprive a child’s right of residence of any useful effect, ie effet utile. 
Terminological differences aside, the Ruiz Zambrano judgment increases this effet utile in 
two regards: Firstly, third party nationals with dependent minor children who are Union 
Citizens gain unrestricted access to the European labour market. Secondly, the Court 
deduces this right from the status of the children as Union Citizens, regardless of any cross 
boarder reference and independently from the exercise of any Fundamental Freedom.100  
 
Indeed, the Court first acknowledges that Directive 2004/38101 explicitly limits its scope to 
Union Citizens ‘who move to or reside in a Member State other than that of which they are 
a national’102. However the Court subsequently bases its decision directly on Art 20 TFEU, 
without mentioning, that these rights of Union Citizens ‘shall be exercised in accordance 
with the conditions and limits defined by the Treaties and by the measures adopted 
thereunder [ie Directive 2004/38!]’103.104 
 
With a view to methodological stringency, the failure to mention this clause is a regrettable 
weakness. The Court’s extremely short, if not erratic reasoning does not contribute to any 
further development of effet utile as a meta-rule. However, such contentious cases fuel the 
discourse and may therefore serve as points of departure for further considerations on effet 
utile. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The fiction of the one correct meaning of a legal provision serves at least two purposes. On 
the one hand, it is a basic pre-condition for (the ideal or illusion of) legal certainty. On the 
other hand it legitimises (political) value judgments as scientific truth or legal necessity.105 
It is definitely more sophisticated – yet similarly flawed – to translate value judgments into 
methodological necessities.   
 
A realistic approach towards interpretation fruitfully challenges widespread (more 
orthodox) beliefs concerning the process of interpretation but also the self-conception of law 
as a science (and legal scholars as scientists). What is more, a close reading of Kelsen – the 
proto-positivist – finds that he anticipates a lot of the realistic input and therefore also 
challenges the formalistic-positivistic narrative (e.g. in traditional Austrian legal thinking). 
Keeping in mind that language as a medium for law is vague but also based on conventions, 
I argued for a moderate realistic point of view. Even in the absence of an objective meaning 
a law-applying organ cannot arbitrarily ascribe any meaning to a norm. What is more the 
Court of Justice depends on the acceptance of its decisions within the legal community – not 
                                                 
98 ibid para 44. 
99 Case C-200/02 Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2004] ECR I-9925 para 45. 
100 cf Krzysztof Chmielewski, ‘Das Aufenthaltsrecht von drittstaatsangehörigen Familienangehörigen von 
Unionsbürgern nach dem Urteil des EuGH C-34/09’ [2011] migralex 74, 77. 
101 Council Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L158/77. 
102 ibid art 3 (1). 
103 Art 20 (2) TFEU. 
104 Loic Azoulai, ‘“Euro-Bonds” The Ruiz Zambrano judgment or the Real Invention of EU Citizenship’ (2011) 
3 Perspectives on Federalism 31, 35. 
105 Kelsen, Pure Theory (n 5) 356. 
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in terms of validity but in terms of effectiveness. Provocatively it could be argued that a 
decision which lacks such acceptance may be valid but wrong.  
 
What does this mean for the (re-)conception of effet utile? 
With a view to the Court of Justice as a court of last resort, the particularities of 
interpretation in the context of EU law and the sheer amount of case law referring to effet 
utile the analysis of argumentative patterns proves somewhat intricate. Effet utile could then 
merely be the leitmotif in the re-narration of a never-ending story – case by case. Effet utile 
can also be regarded as a political slogan aiming at convincing the legal (or much more 
political) community of the Court’s rationality. 
 
And finally, to the extent that the Court of Justice enters into a discourse and makes its 
understanding of effet utile and the aims and purposes of the Treaties transparent, we can 
derive meta-rules of interpretation from these argumentative patterns. Recalling that the 
Court ultimately depends on the acceptance of its decisions in the legal community, it has to 
be said that some of the Court’s decisions, like Ruiz Zambrano, are disappointing in terms of 
argumentative style.  
 
Whereas it appears untenable to criticise the Court of Justice on grounds of national 
methodological preconceptions, a re-conception of effet utile as a meta-rule of interpretation 
may enhance the systematic assessment of EU law and be a small fragment of a developing 
genuine European methodology. 
 
